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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GADDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY,
A Corporation, and KEITH L.
KNIGHT,doing business as KNIGHT
REALTY COMPANY,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 8188

vs.
CHARLES H. MORRISON,

Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 1, 1952, the defendant, Charles H. Morrison,
executed and delivered to the Knight Realty Company a listing
contract for tl1e sale of his real property in Salt Lake City,
Utah, for a period of six months from date of said listing
contract.
Among the provisions of this listing contract is the following:
3
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"During the life of this contract, if you find a buyer,
who is ready, able and willing to buy or exchange said
property or any part thereof, at said price and terms,
or any other price or terms, to which I may agree in
writing, or if I agree to an exchange of said property,
or any part thereof, or if said property or any part
thereof is sold, or exchange during said term by myself
or any other person, firm or corporation, I agree to pay
you the commission recommended by the Salt Lake
Real Estate Board for such sale or exchange; or if sold
or exchange within three months after such expiration
to any person, firm or corporation to whom the property
was offered by me, or you, or any member of the
Multiple Listing Bureau of the Salt Lake Real Estate
Board, during the term of this listing, I agree to pay
you the commission above stated, and in case of the
employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms
.of this agreement, I agree to pay a reasonable attorney's
fee and all costs of collection." (Exhibit P-A).
During the term of this agreement, the Gaddis Investment
Company, one of the plaintiffs herein, who is a member of
the Multiple Listing Board of Salt Lake City, whose right it
was to procure a buyer for any real property listed for sale
under the terms of the agreement of the l\1ultiple Listing
Board with their members, procured a buyer for the property
of the defendant, who was able, willing and ready to buy
the property, and in accordance therewith, both the defendant,
as Seller and one Thomas B. Allen and Mary Lee Allen, as
the Buyers of said property executed an Earnest Money Receipt and offer to purchase on the 9th day of August, 1952
(Exhibit P-B), and a deposit was placed by the Buyers with
the Gaddis Investment Company, as brokc:r, to bind the deal.
Pending the time for the final Uniform Real Estate Con4
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tract to be signed by the Seller and the Buyers, in accordance
with the practice of closing such deals, a question arose as to
the policy of the members of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board
being a party to the sale of real estate to colored people, (the
buyers in this case being colored people) ( T r. 48) , and according to the evidence, the Gaddis Investment Company
advised the Seller and the Buyers that the sale would have
to be delayed for a short time until they could get a clearance
with the Real Estate Board regarding the sale of real estate
to colored people in certain restricted areas (Tr. 36 and 42).
Pursuant to this the Buyers demanded their deposit back
(Tr. 39), which was returned to them by the Gaddis Investment
Co., which they were probably obligated to do, inasmuch
as they were not satisfied with the delay, although there was
nothing in the preliminary earnest money receipt (Exhibit
P-B) as to the time when the contract was to be concluded.
In the meantime, and pending the clearance of this question with the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, which was some
ten or fifteen days (Tr. 49) the defendant closed the deal
(Exhibits D-4 and D-5) and sold the said property to the
Aliens, the purchaser procured by the Gaddis Investment
Company and then refused to pay the commission for the
sale of the property in accordance with the listing contract
hereinabove referred to as Exhibit P-A. This suit was then instituted to recover the commission in the sum of $3 70.00
together with attorney's fees and court costs, and after the
close of the cv idence the court took the matter under advisement and after submission of briefs by the respective counsels
for said parties rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
5
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and against the defendant pursuant to the prayer of the complaint.

ARGUMENT
In appellants' abstract he presents the following points
which he contends the court erred in its decision:

PROPOSITION L
STATE COURTS CANNOT BE USED TO ASSIST
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS IN
ABRIDGING THE PRIVILEGES AND IM1fUNITIES
GUARANTEED TO CITIZENS UNDER THE 14th AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.

PROPOSITION 2.
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND
THE FACTS SPECIALLY AND STATE SEPARATELY ITS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THEREON.

PROPOSITION 3.
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ELMER R. SMITH.
6
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PROPOSITION 4.
WHEN ONE CONTRACTOR REFUSES TO PERFORM
ANY PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE OTHER
MAY TREAT THE WHOLE CONTRACT AS ABANDONED.
These propositions will be taken up in their respective
order and answered by Respondent herein.

APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION 1.
STATE COURTS CANNOT BE USED TO ASSIST
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS IN
ABRIDGING THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
GUARANTEED TO CITIZENS UNDER THE 14th AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.
Respondent will take very little time in arguing this question. In the main we agree with this proposition, but take the
stand that this proposition is not within the perview of the
issues of this case. The court was not used in this case to assist
private corporations or individuals in abridging the immunities
and privileges of citizens and particularly the defendant in
this case. The only question in this case is: Did the Appellant
and the Respondents enter into a contract for the sale of
realty and did the Respondents perform their obligations and
conditions of sJ.id contract, and if so were they entitled to
remuneration for their services, according to the conditions
and terms of the contract?
7
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The question as to the purchaser of this property being
a colored person only came into this matter incidentally and
was not a determinable factor in the case at all. The only
reason for a delay in closing the purchase of this property
on the part of the Respondents was that Respondents had to
clear themselves with the rules and regulations of the Salt
Lake Real Estate Board without involving themselves, with
respect to consummating sales of real property to people not
of the Caucasian race and unless this delay had something to
do with the violation of the listing contract on the part of
the Respondents, it has no place in this matter.
Respondents have no arguments against the authorities
cited by Appellant but contend they are beside the point and
not applicable to the determination of the issues in this case,
and for that reason we will not attempt to go into this question
further.
Counsel for Appellant has attempted to show that because
there was a restrictive covenant in the abstract of title to this
property attempting to restrict the sale of said property to
colored people that that was the reason the Respondents
would not go through with the sale, but this was positively
denied by Respondents (Tr. 37 and 50 )._and there is no other
evidence in this case supporting this proposition. The sale
was consummated and the property was sold to the buyers,
who were colored people, procured by the Respondents. We
do not desire to elaborate on this proposition further for
the reasons hereinabove stated.

8
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APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION II
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND
THE FACTS SPECIALLY AND STATE SEPARATELY ITS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THEREON.
It is difficult for Respondents to see why the Appellant
raises any issue with relation to his Proposition 2. We refer
the court to. the findings of fact and conclusions of law and
judgment signed by the lower court as reflected by the record
at pages 95-96-97. The contents thereof were what the court
found and reached its conclusions of law and judgment based
upon the evidence submitted in this case. We assume that Appellant is of the opinion that the court should have considered
his Proposition 1 in this case and made findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgment in accordance with that question, but it is the contention of Respondents that the court
did not consider that proposition as bearing upon the issues
in this case and hence did not make any findings of fact or
conclusions of law with relation thereto, because this proposition was not part of the case, but, at most, was only incidental
thereto in the evidence, and was not part of the question
as to whether the Respondents performed their part of the
listing contract and rendered the services in accordance therewith to the Appellant.
We have no dispute with the law cited in this proposition
by Appellant, but say that it is beside the point. The findings
of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment entered by
the lower court was entirdy what the court found pursuant
to the evidence and entered in accordance therewith. The court
9
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ordered that plaintiff be awarded judgment as prayed (R. 94).
We think we need go no further into this proposition.

APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION III
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ELMER R. SMITH.
Appellant called as his witness a Mr. Elmer R. Smith,
(Tr. 81-82) who stated his name was Elmer R. Smith and was
associate professor of anthropology at the University of Utah,
and pursuant thereto the court said:
THE COURT: Wait a minute. I don't see that this
is going to have anything to do with this case, is it?
I don't want to get into any racial anthropology here.
I treat colored people just like I do whites.
MR. OLIVER: My purpose, your honor, for calling
this witness is to show as a matter of fact that this
type of lawsuit will have social reaction in the community designed to foster and encourage restrictive
covenants and that the court as such has no authority,
power to lend its aid in that direction.
THE COURT: You don't need to quote me an anthropologist on that. You can quote law by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
MR. OLIVER: I am calling Professor Smith as socialist, and I will qualify him.
THE COURT: I don't need to hear it. The Supreme
Court of the United States has spoken on that. I don't
have any power to aid or assist those people who enter
into these covenants. I think that is rather clear in the
law.
10
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MR. OLIVER: My point is this, that a judgment
in favor of plaintiff in this case will do just that, and
that is what I am calling this particular witness for.
THE COURT: I don't want to hear it. I don't think I
need that. You can excuse Mr. Smith.
Respondent assumes the foregoing discussion between
counsel for Appellant and the Court, that Appellant wanted
to go into the sociological question of the differences in races,
which the court concluded was not a part of the issues of this
case, and supports the contention of Respondents as argued
hereinabove as to Appellant's Proposition 1. This clearly
shows that the court did not take into consideration this question in determining the issues of this case, but treated it as
one of purely contractual relations and whether Respondents
performed under the terms of the listing contract, hence no
necessity of findings of fact and conclusions of law with relation
to the sociological proposition that Appellant has endeavored
to introduce in this case. We think this needs no further argument.

APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION IV.
WHEN ONE CONTRACTOR REFUSES TO PERFORM
ANY PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE OTHER
MAY TREAT THE WHOLE CONTRACT AS ABANDONED.
The two cases cited by Appellant in support of this proposition are not in point with the question raised in this case
now before the court. In each of these cases, (Appellant's
Brief, page 23) there was a failure on the part of the plaintiff
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to perform the conditions and terms of their respective contracts, according to the facts in each case. In the Torrey vs.
Shea case, 155 P. 829, the plaintiff failed to deliver the merchandise ordered by the defendant in the second year of his
contract and hence breached his contract and the defendant
candled his contract.
In the Chaffee vs. Widman case, 108 P. 995 the broker
failed to follow through with his agreement and abandoned
the contract and did nothing to further his agreement, which
was not in force at the time the defendant therein completed
his deal with the buyer. He did not procure a purchaser that
was able and willing to perform, but had abandoned the contract. Plaintiff brought his action on an entirely different
theory which the court held he could not recover. The facts
of these cases are not applicable to the facts in the instant case.
The only questions involved in the instant case, according
to Respondents' contention, are as follows:
(a) Did the Respondents and Appellants enter into
a bona fide listing contract for the sale of Appellant's real property ?
(b) Did the Respondents procure a Buyer who was
able, ready and willing to buy the Appellant's
property?
(c) Was the sale consummated with the Buyer procured by the Respondent?
(d) Was the listing contract in force at the time of
the consummation of the sale of Appellant's
property?
Answering and disposing of questions (a) and (d), we
refer to Exhibit P-A in which there is no dispute as to the con12
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tract and the terms thereof. The contract was for a period of
six months from the date thereof, to-wit: August 1, 1952.
Exhibit D-5 is a Uniform Real Estate Contract executed by
appellant and wife as Sellers and Thomas Allen and Mary
Bell Allen, his wife, as Buyers and dated August 25, 1952,
which was well within the six months period of the listing
contract although it was consummated by the Appellant and the
Buyers, but the sale was made to the Buyers who were produced
by the Respondents and in accordance with the terms of the listing contract, Exhibit P-A the Appellant was obligated to pay
the commission. Said terms being as follows:
"or if said property of any part thereof is sold, or
exchanged during said term by myself or any other person, firm or corporation, I agree to pay you the commission recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate
Board for such sale or exchange;" etc.
In support of the questiones (b) and (c), it is the contention of the Respondents that the Respondents did procure
a buyer who was able, ready and willing to buy, and did buy.
The Contract Exhibit P-B discloses that the Buyers signed and
the Seller also signed and accepted. There was some delay
between the time Exhibit P-B was signed and Exhibit D-5 was
signed, due to a clearance to be obtained by Respondents as
outlined hereinabove. But the fact of the matter is the Appellant did not lose his sale for the reason that he closed the sale
himself. He sold to the party whom the Respondent had
procured for him, and the Respondent had done everything
required of the Respondents up to the point of holding the
matter up for a clearance. The holding of the matter up did
not lose the sale, because the sale was consummated between
13
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the Appellant and the Buyers whom the Respondents had
procured for the Appellant. If Appellant had lost the sale
because of the delay in procuring the clearance then there
would have been no question that Respondents would not be
entitled to a commission. The delay was not because of any
voluntary or malicious act on the part of the Respondents.
It was done as a precaution, for the broker's protection and
was not a voluntary or involuntary act on the part of the Respondent, and for that reason we say there was no abandonment
of the contract or the services of the Respondent (Tr. 55-5657-58-59-61-62-63-64) nor was the listing cancelled because
of the delay or otherwise as will appear by the testimony of
Mr. W aldis, an agent of the Knight Realty Company hereinabove referred to in the transcript.
If the sale had been lost because of the conduct of the
broker and the Appellant had to sell at a later time or had
sustained damages otherwise, the Appellant probably could
have sued the Respondents for damages. But the sale was not
lost, and the Appellant got out of his sale all that he bargained
for, and should pay the commission.
At no time did the Appellant revoke the authority of the
Respondents, nor did the Respondents at any time terminate
or abandon the contract and the same was in full force and
effect at the time the sale was made by the Appellant to the
party procured by the Respondents.
Let us examine some law with relation to such listing
contracts and services of brokers to Sellers:
C.

J. S. Vol.

12, page 150, Par. 66.
14
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"Conversely, the owner cannot defeat the right of
the broker to a commission or other compensation by

terminating the agency after the broker has procured
a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the property
on the terms suggested by the owner and has communicated that fact to the owner. This is especially true
where the principal eventually sells his property to
such a person."
C. ]. S. Vol. 12, page 186, Par. 84.

"In many cases however, the broker's right to a commission depends on the ultimate completion or final
consummation of the deal or transaction which he was
employed to negotiate."
117 Pac. 575, Calif. Justy et al vs. Erro. Calif.
"Nor is it necessary that the broker should personally
have conducted the negotiations between his principal
and the purchaser leading to the sale, nor that he should
have been present when the bargain was completed, or
even that the principal should have at the time known
that the purchaser was one found by the broker. Section 966, Mecham on Agency, and cases cited in the
foot note thereof. And, while it is indispensable,
yet it is sufficient that his efforts was the procuring
cause of the sale; that, through his agency, the purchaser was brought into communication with the seller,
although the parties negotiated in person."
Peterson vs. Shannon, 1 Pac. 2d 630. Idaho.
"After a broker has found a customer and commenced negotiations, neither the principal nor the
customer can break them off and defeat the broker's
right to a commission by concluding the transaction
without his aid. Nor can a principal reject an offer
made by a person found by a broker and then without
the broker's intervention sell to the same person and
15
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thus defeat the broker's right to a commission. A broker
is entitled to a commission for effecting a sale, although
he takes no part in the negotiations, where the sale is
effected as a result of his introducing the customer and
the principal or of his putting them into communication; the principal cannot defeat the right to compensation by closing the transaction directly with the customer without the broker's further aid."
C. J. S. Vol. 12, page 212, Par. 91.
"Where the parties are brought together as a result
of the broker's efforts, and a sale, lease, or exchange
results, the broker becomes entitled to a commission,
although he is not present during or takes no part in
the negotiations between the parties or the closing of
the bargain.
Byrd vs. Bruce-Jones Live Stock Commission. 266 Pac.
743, Kansas.
"There appears no question but that the defendant
received the benefit of the efforts of the plaintiff in
complying with his contractual obligations. A reasonable
conclusoin follows that the plaintiff is entitled to his
commission on the cattle in question."
We do not deem it necessary to quote further from
authorities with respect to the foregoing, as this seems too
elementary and many more decisions to this effect could be
quoted, but we supply the foregoing in support of our contention that although there may have been delay on the part of
the Respondents in this action in getting this sale completed,
(which, however, was done in good faith by the Respondents),
the sale did go through, and the defendant did receive the
benefit of the efforts of the Respondents as stated in the Kan16
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sas case, supra, with the party whom the Respondents did produce, and to deprive the Respondents of their commission
would be an unjust enrichment for the defendant.
The sale was made within the time provided by the listing
contract. There had been no cancellation or revocation or
abandonment of this agreement on the part of the Respondents
with the Appellant as revealed by the evidence.
In conclusion we refer the court to the following authority
which seems to be directly in point and in support of Respondents' contention, to-wit:
C. J. S. Vol. 12, page 207-8, Par. 91.
"Provided the case is not taken out of the rule by
the terms of the contract of employment, such contract
is complied with in other respects, and the principal
has not put himself in a position where it is improper
for him to raise the question of procuring cause, it
is necessary and sufficient to entitled a broker to a
commission, that he be the efficient, procuring, or inducing cause of the sale or other transaction be the
direct and proximate result of his efforts or services.
In view of the foregoing we respectfully submit that the
judgment of the lower court in this matter should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN SPENCE,
Attorney for Respondents
1401 Walker Bank Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah

17
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